Today a friend has agreed to write a guest blog for Not So Great Game. His name is Lee Skluzak and he’s a former China Fulbright Scholar and University of Michigan masters program graduate. He’s a super smart guy writing on a super important topic that got a surprisingly little amount of attention:
A Doctrinal Shift in American Military Strategy?
In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, American military planners underwent an extensive process of reflection and evaluation. They understood that the conflict, initially launched on the premise of containment and anti-communism, had become bogged down and dragged out over years, leading not only to the muddling of its original purpose but also to the squandering of public support on which democratic war must be sustained. In order to avoid future Vietnams, subsequent strategic thinkers formulated several basic guidelines for the use of force in American military strategy. These principles were first articulated by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and were further publicized and elaborated on by General Colin Powell in the early 1990s. What became known as the “Powell Doctrine,” embraced the following tenets regarding the use of force:
1) The vital interests of the United States or its allies must be at stake.
2) Once the decision to use force is made, there must also be a commitment to decisive victory.
3) Political and military objectives must be clear and obtainable
4) Whatever force is necessary to achieve those objectives and obtain victory should be made available and regularly reviewed.
5) There should be a strong basis for the American public to support the operation.
6) Force should be used only as a last resort, after all other alternatives have been exhausted.
In light of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were many criticisms which drew explicitly from these principles. Indeed, the “Powell Doctrine” experienced something of a renaissance because of how the second Iraq War was conducted and prosecuted. Now, as our presence in Iraq begins to wind down and President Obama hints of a gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011, what will American military strategy look like in the future? Will the “Powell Doctrine” once again become the dominant paradigm?
There may be a clue to this question in a recent speech given by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Michael Mullen. In his remarks to Kansas State University, Admiral Mullen lays out what one might call a “Mullen Doctrine.” In the first part of the speech, he reviews past U.S. military doctrines and explains how each has something to teach us. “There is no one single defining American way of war,” Mullen says, “It changes over time, and it should change over time, adapting appropriately to the most relevant threats to our national security, and the means by which that security is best preserved.”
This goes especially for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which have had their own substantial impact on the conduct and character of war. In the second part of the speech, Mullen expounds on how these conflicts have shaped his thought, “I’ve watched and advised two administrations as they have dealt with this struggle. And I’ve come to three conclusions – three principles – about the proper use of modern military forces. The first is that military power should not – maybe cannot – be the last resort of the state.” [emphasis added]
Here is a repudiation of what might be regarded as the cornerstone of the “Powell Doctrine.” Moreover, it seems almost counterintuitive given the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. But Admiral Mullen is not throwing all his chips in with the military instrument. He further argues, “Defense and diplomacy are simply no longer discrete choices, one to be applied when the other one fails, but must, in fact, complement one another throughout the messy process of international relations.” In fact, he reveals, “My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving fast enough in this regard. U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands. It’s one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders; quite another to always have to be the fire chief.”
There are other indications that while Mullen is going beyond the “Powell Doctrine” by dropping the “last resort” caveat, he is also incorporating many of its core elements. For example, he echoes (2) and (4):
“I would argue that in the future struggles of the asymmetric counterinsurgent variety, we ought to make it a precondition of committing our troops, that we will do so only if and when the other instruments of national power are ready to engage as well.”
Admiral Mullen’s second principle is also resounding endorsement of (3):
“Force should, to the maximum extent possible, be applied in a precise and principled way.”
Finally, the third principle of the “Mullen Doctrine” is congruent with the spirit of the “Powell Doctrine.” It holds that, “Policy and strategy should constantly struggle with one another.” The nature of war is as fluid today as it was in the jungles of Vietnam. The enemy is no longer the Vietcong but a shadowy criminal syndicate that embraces an extreme Islamist ideology. It consists of state and non-state actors. Their bases of operations are constantly in flux, existing in restive border regions, failed states, cyberspace and beyond. Policies promulgated today will not necessarily be applicable in the future and strategy must be flexible and capable of adapting. That means constant reevaluation, something that Powell himself endorsed wholeheartedly when he was in Vietnam and when he served in the same position as Admiral Mullen.
Curiously enough, there was one part of the speech that I think deserved further elaboration. Admiral Mullen observes, “there’s been much debate over how to balance traditional and irregular warfare capabilities in our military.” He argues that his second principle applies equally to both, but I am more interested in where the greater emphasis ought to be. Should we pour more resources into preparing for conflicts similar to Iraq and Afghanistan or should we be investing in capabilities suitable to the next generation of great power conflict? This question gets at the heart of future American foreign policy and I hope is explored in greater detail.
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/03/08/speech_on_military_strategy_98844.html
