The SCO and the Violence in Kyrgyzstan

Just moved to Ufa, Russia for a summer of language study. Posts will be rare for awhile.

Although the SCO meeting was important for several reasons, it received very little attention in the media, even in Russia and China,
because of the outbreak of violence in southern Kyrgyzstan. I do not think this is a coincidence. It is likely that Bakiyev, or at least
his supporters in southern Kygyzstan, decided to instigate the violence during the SCO meeting to show that supporters of the former
government are still powerful. By causing trouble during the SCO meeting, they were also able to embarrass the organization by showing
its inability to deal with a crisis.

Even though Hu Jintao and Dmitri Medvedev were both present, the SCO was only able to issue a weak declaration calling for dialogue between the two factions. It’s interesting that the SCO did not express full support for the government or condemn the instigators of the violence. This could be for several reasons. First, it’s possible that the violence was too recent and it was unclear what was really going on. Second, the the heads of state may have thought that the central government was incapable of using force to settle the conflict. By not painting things in black and white they maintained the possibility for negotiations.

A third possible reason has to do with the strange nature of this ‘ethnic’ conflict: Kyrgyz are attacking Uzbeks because they oppose the
mostly Kyrgyz government in Bishkek. I was in Osh last summer and there was not a great deal of tension between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.
Unlike the Uighurs in Xinjiang, I did not sense a great deal of dissatisfaction on the part of the Uzbeks or Kyrgyz in ethnic terms.
think it is pretty clear that the violence that occurred was more of a demonstration than a sudden violent outburst due to boiling ethnic
hatred. Whether or not it remains a ‘demonstration’ of course is unclear given the wide breadth of violence. Even Kyrgyz who support
the central government may be drawn into the fighting if the Bakiyevites accidentally spark a full-blown war. Given the complicated
nature of the conflict, it’s not surprising the SCO had no immediate gameplan.

The problem however is that it is precisely situations like this that demonstrate the weakness of the SCO model. It is both
non-interventionist but wants wants to fight separatism, terrorism, and extremism. Right now the CSTO is the organization being talked
about making a possible response, not the SCO (but Medvedev said the CSTO should only be used for external aggression). So much for the ‘militarized’ SCO.

Three more quick things about the fighting. The Kyrgyz authorities have asked for Russia to intervene to stop the fighting, but Medvedev has said that this still remains a domestic problem. I think there are several reasons the Russians may be reluctant. First, it is possible that they think the fighting is just a way of showing off, and if they go in it will just make the problem even bigger and increase Bakiyev’s importance. Second, the Russians probably are not looking forward to making themselves targets; let’s not forget most Kyrgyz still think that the Russians were behind the ouster of Bakiyev. A third possibility is that the Russians are negotiating. By this I mean they may be holding out for more concessions from the Kyrgyz authorities, like perhaps expulsion of the American air base. I would find it somewhat surprising if this is the main reason, given the improvement in relations between Washington and Moscow. But if the Russians do go in, I don’t think it’s likely the anti-terrorist center planned for southern Kyrgyzstan by America will happen.

Second, keep an eye on Uzbekistan. Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have been terrible. The Uzbeks last year shut down the border with Kyrgyzstan because of alleged terrorist attacks over the border. Arguments over water continue to affect the relationship as well. Given that Uzbeks are the ones being hurt, it would not surprise me if the Uzbeks start causing problems.

Third, China’s response has been somewhat impressive. They are already in the process of evacuating Chinese citizens to Urumqi with Nanhang flights. I can’t think of another time when China has evacuated its nationals on such a large scale.

So what did the SCO accomplish? Well, it insulted Iran pretty strongly. It said that states under UN sanctions cannot join the
organization. Given that China and Russia both voted FOR sanctions just a few days earlier, this is a pretty amazing rebuke to Iran. It
certainly gives a lot of ammunition to those analysts that argue the SCO is not an anti-American organization (although one reliable
Russian newspaper I read did say the Uzbeks tried to offer Washington observer status, but the Chinese said no). This declaration is a strong counter-point to the 2005 declaration that wanted a deadline for American troops in Central Asia. The SCO also passed
regulations for new states to join, and India and Pakistan both fit the criteria. However, it remains to be seen if the states really do
enter, and how the SCO would deal with the problems of both states joining.

The Global Financial Crisis as Perceptual Shock

[Guest post by Lee Skluzak]

I was living in Beijing when the “global financial crisis” (GFC) began sweeping across the world. At the time I was trying to think of a topic for my master’s thesis, something dealing with Chinese foreign affairs and something that would also have policy relevance. My initial proposal (subsequently shelved because its scope went far beyond the parameters for a master’s paper) was to view contemporary Chinese foreign policy behavior through the prism of neoclassical realism. Without going into all the theoretical details, neoclassical realism basically argues that while states do respond to shifts in the relative balance of international power there are different intervening variables that influence when and how those shifts occur. They can be broadly divided into two types: (1) elite perceptions of relative power and its distribution within the international system, and (2) the state’s overall extractive capacity to mobilize resources and manpower. The first is perhaps obvious since states have to detect changes in the international system before they act accordingly. The second is a logical extension of the first: states may be able to perceive new threats and opportunities in the international system but they might not have the wherewithal to effectively marshal society’s resources behind an appropriate national strategy.

When we think about elite perceptions and their relationship to the international balance-of-power, a familiar question naturally arises: how do elites become cognizant of changes in their relative position? On the one hand, because national strength is often intimately connected with the economic health of a country, macro-statistics, for example national GDP and trade patterns, are used as convenient guideposts for detecting gradual trends in the tectonic plates of global politics. On the other hand, many nations enjoy sustained economic growth over several decades without necessarily embarking on a radical change in their foreign policy. At what point does the steady drip of long-term secular trends facilitate fundamental change in the way a country views itself and its relationship with the world? The proposal at the time focused on the importance of “perceptual shocks” in ushering these transitions.

A “Perceptual shock” is an event whose dramatic impact serves to illuminate the evolving balance-of-power and to crystallize in the minds of policymakers their new relative position. Perceptual shocks are usually crises which, depending on each state, can signal strength or weakness in a variety of ways. A prevailing international economic system, for example, may be severely challenged if its underlying efficiency or legitimacy is undermined. Those states whose power and leadership uphold the status quo can also suffer greatly if their values and ideas are perceived as failing. In the face of creeping malaise, national confidence wanes. Economic hard times give rise to isolationist tendencies and the temptation to cut commitments overseas. Global leadership falters and power vacuums emerge. It isn’t difficult to see how the GFC could be viewed as a perfect perceptual shock candidate.

For one thing, the GFC has called into question the viability of the American-led neoliberal international system.  Where the United States was once revered as a model for financial and economic management, now countries have grown cautious and skeptical.  For China it is not only the perceived repudiation of the American system that motivates officials but also the vindication of Beijing’s own style of development. The number of articles that have come out over the past two years regarding China’s growing assertiveness, even arrogance, can be explained partially by the perceptual shock thesis. A vocal call for replacing the dollar as a global currency, the collapse of climate change talks at Copenhagen, escalating naval activity and assertion of “core interests” in the South China Sea, and a consistent inflexibility over Yuan appreciation all point to an attitudinal shift in Chinese foreign policy. Indeed, I would contend that China’s foreign policy behavior, especially during 2009, reflects an elite seemingly flushed with its own triumphalism, a kind of “End of History” in reverse.

It should be noted, however, that the rhetoric has subsided a bit over the past few months. Likely, the policy debate in Beijing is highly fragmented. Some factions are probably in favor of a more unapologetic China, standing up and asserting its newfound influence and interests abroad. Others, more concerned about the elusive quest for social stability, would rather ignore the siren call of great power politics and continue with what has worked; robust economic growth and a small international profile. Aaron Friedberg’s account of British relative decline during the early twentieth century hints at a similar process moving in the other direction. As Britain faced mounting challenges to its relative power, the process of identifying and adapting to these changes was complicated by bureaucratic and functional disagreements over the nature of the decline. Friedberg concludes that “external shocks are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for downward adjustments in assessments. The presence of ‘change agents’ ready to capitalize on sudden developments is critical to the process through which such shifts occur.” The GFC offers an opportunity for “change agents” within the Chinese government to argue for a more activist foreign policy. We would do well to figure out who those “change agents” are and what they might think.

Non-traditional vs. traditional threats and Chinese foreign policy

Two opeds today in Chinese papers have very different ideas about the importance of non-traditional security threats and how important cooperation with the United States is.

Let’s first look at the piece by Pan Zhongying of People’s University in Global Times. He argues that Sino-American cooperation against non-traditional security threats is limited for three reasons. First, ‘China and America and their two militaries are very different in terms of quality, mission, structure, power, interests and values.’ America is the number one interventionist power in the world: ‘not intervening is not the American military.’ China, on the other hand, despite its increased interests overseas has not changed its policy of non-intervention.

Second, Pan argues that ‘non-traditional threats do not only have Sino-American cooperation, but also include differences and even conflict. For example, with regards to climate change there is conflict in cooperation.’ One of my professors at Fudan last year made the same argument, which was remarkably prescient given what happened at Copenhagen.

Third, Pan argues that many aspects of non-traditional security threats are ‘American concepts,’ and that China needs to provide its own ideas about what that word means.

Wang Yizhou of Peking University has a very different way of looking at things. Wang argues that traditional security threats in the east like Taiwan, the South China Sea, and Korea are now in a ‘controllable situation.’ The real threat is from non-traditional security threats in the west. Recently Russia and China have seen serious disturbances and terrorist attacks, which ‘proves that the vaccination is not enough to prevent disease, and that international terrorism is a threat that is still increasing.’ China’s focus is wrong: it should be looking west, not east. He also seems to imply cooperation with the west is important:

For a significant time into the future, the entire Islamic belt will be in a ‘high temperature, high crisis’ situation, the contest and its conclusion between America and its western allies against extremism are still extremely uncertain, and this struggle to a great extent will determine the good or bad form of international security and the state of international terrorism.

Many analysts, such as Kenneth Lieberthal, argue that fighting non-traditional threats can be a basis for Sino-American cooperation. Stephen Van Evera even argues that the great powers should enter into a concert to fight against proliferation, terrorism, and threats to the global commons like climate change. But those arguments have a lot of assumptions. How important do the Chinese see non-traditional security threats? How easy is it to surpass power politics to fight together against them? Do China and the US even want to fight non-traditional security threats in the same way? We won’t know the answer to those questions until we figure out whether Beijing is listening to Wang or Pan.

So the Russians and the Chinese really HAVE switched places

A few weeks ago I argued that it seemed China and Russia were switching places: China was grumpy and the Russians wanted to play ball. Two interesting articles in my inbox today, one from Johnson’s Russia List and one from the China Leadership Monitor, seem to indicate that this is indeed the case. JRL shares an AFP article arguing that Russia has decided to switch to a pro-West policy. Michael Swaine in CLM says that a consensus is forming that China is growing increasingly assertive and anti-American. What happened to the Russians being the belligerent bad guys and the Chinese being much more careful?

Let’s look at the AFP article, which is pretty amazing. Medvedev has adopted a new ‘Program for Effective Use of Foreign Policy in the Long Term Development of Russia’:

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov wrote in the introduction that the best way to assure Russian interests in the modern world is to rapidly realise modernisation in Russia, a flagship project of Medvedev.

Russia needs to forge “modernising alliances” with Western Europe and the EU to attract foreign capital, Lavrov wrote in the doctrine, the entire text of which was posted on the Newsweek website.

“The greatest importance will be attached to the … strengthening of relations of mutual dependence with leading world and regional powers based on mutual penetration of economy and culture,” Lavrov wrote….

“This means that foreign policy is no longer an obsession about the country’s place in the world hierarchy but about attracting resources for its modernisation,” said Dmitry Trenin, director of the Moscow Carnegie Centre.

“There should be less pathos and more practicality to serve the wellbeing of the country,” he told AFP.

Newsweek said that doctrine would mark a major Russian shift away to a more pragmatic foreign policy after years of prickly relations with the European Union and United States.

“The economic crisis showed that we cannot develop Russia on our own,” a foreign ministry source told the weekly. “We are going to have to rely on someone.“

And how do the Chinese fit in this new strategy?

Particular attention should be paid to the growing role of China and “the consequences for our global and regional interests”, Lavrov said.

Now let’s compare this to Swaine’s article which says the Chinese are moving in the opposite direction:

Western observers largely date China’s increased level of assertiveness from 2008, citing Wen Jiabao’s criticism of the United States for its economic mismanagement and senior Chinese central bank officials’ questioning of the dollar’s continued role as the international reserve currency. Indeed, many of the examples of assertive or confrontational Chinese statements and actions relate to economic issues. These include greater constraints on foreign companies operating in China and systematic PRC discrimination in favor of so-called “national champions”; increasing cyber-attacks on foreign firms in China (such as Google), and Beijing’s strong response to Western hints that the PRC government is behind such attacks; a more activist stance at international economic meetings such as the G-20; strong resistance to U.S. pressure to significantly appreciate the RMB; and more recent reiterations of Chinese criticism of Washington’s monetary policy.

Many Western observers also point to Chinese assertiveness in several other foreign policy areas, including: An allegedly hard-line, obstructionist, and deliberately insulting stance at the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen; persistent resistance to UNSC sanctions against Iran for its nuclear activities; the supposedly humiliating treatment accorded to President Obama during his visit to China in 2009; and unprecedented levels of testiness (including demands and threats) toward other nations.

Finally, Western observers also cite what they regard as Beijing’s unusually assertive and even confrontational stance toward Obama’s late-2009 decisions to sell arms to Taiwan and to meet with the Dalai Lama. In the both cases, Chinese officials warned of strong retaliatory responses, including, in the former case, an unprecedented threat to sanction U.S. defense industry companies active in China, such as Boeing.

It’s not clear that the Russians are really that sincere about cooperation. Mixed signs persist. Although American troops participated in the Victory Day parade on Red Square on May 9th, Putin did allegedly snub the US by rejecting an invitation for Biden to participate. We all remember how much the Russians love Biden.

And we shouldn’t exaggerate changes in Chinese policy. It seems the Chinese did not really want to embarrass Obama in Copenhagen, and Beijing is still a long way away from being a full-blown revisionist power. There are no signs the Chinese are willing to let the relationship with Washington fall apart.

But….. these are still significant developments and it’s curious as to why this happened. Did the Russians decide to cooperate because America finally extended an open hand? Is it because the crisis taught them they need the west’s help? I think those are partly the answer… but I think a realist explanation is more credible. Let’s look at the timing of this sudden change of heart.

First, the Ukrainian presidential election has made Ukrainian membership in NATO a non-issue. Second, the Ukrainians have decided to let the Russians keep the base in Sevastopol. Third, the Russians have facilitated an uprising in a former USSR republic, and now it looks like the rest of Central Asia is bandwagoning with Moscow (sorry Stephen Walt.) Fourth, the US has been negotiating seriously with the Russians on nuclear issues. Fifth, Russia’s relationship with POLAND has been improving. Sixth, as implied by Lavrov, the Russians are probably starting to worry a little bit about the Chinese. The interesting thing is that almost none of these have any direct connection with American policy.

So if the Russians are willing to cooperate, it’s probably not completely from a position of weakness during the crisis; I think the Russians just have more swing in their step. Or at least the hard-liners are happy enough in other ways to let Medvedev play around.

What about the Chinese? I think the answer is pretty simple: they have more power, and they want to get more benefits from it. I think the question is less ‘why now?’ than ‘why did it take so long?’. And as I’ve mentioned in previous posts, it seems that the government is having trouble keeping their hard-line military guys in line. Now several scenarios will play out. First, the west is not intimidated by Beijing and Beijing decides it tried too hard. Or, the west is not intimidated and it makes the Chinese even more angry. Or, the West is intimidated and the Chinese or sated. Or, the West is intimidated and China gets even more greedy. Unfortunately, it’s hard to answer that question, since US policy seems to be swaying between the two. Maybe there will be some random series of events that push China in one way. That seems to have happened with Russia. So let’s cross our fingers!

The Great Game Continues and the Loser is Kyrgyzstan

A friend of mine in China recently asked me what I thought the implications of the regime change in Kyrgyzstan are for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and China. Along with Ukrainian president Yanukovich’s decision to allow the Russian Black Sea Fleet to stick around Sevastopol, it looks like the Russians are on a roll.

1. What are the implications for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?

The SCO has played no role in the crisis in Kyrgyzstan for two reasons. First, it is now clear that Russia played a significant role in Bakiyev’s overthrow because of Moscow’s anger at Kyrgyzstan for not taking its interests into account. Although Moscow agreed to give Bishkek a generous amount of loans, the American base at Manas was still not removed. Russia also discussed the possibility of building a new military base in southern Kyrgyzstan, but Kyrgyzstan agreed to allow the United States to build an anti-terror center in the region instead. Although Russia probably did not directly overthrow the Bakiyev administration, it did help facilitate it. This was accomplished by broadcasting anti-Bakiyev news reports on state television, meeting with opposition leaders, and most importantly, rising fuel costs that were the direct cause of the protests. Russia’s swift recognition of the new administration was also key to the opposition’s ability to gain legitimacy for the new government. Given that Russia supported the change in government, it is not surprising that the SCO could not intervene.

Second, the SCO has never decided what its role should be during ‘colored revolutions.’ The organization most strongly demonstrates its weakness when there is a change of government in a member state. The SCO wants stability and supports the authoritarian regimes in the region, but it also is uncomfortable with intervening directly during times of chaos. For example, the SCO also had no meaningful response during the colored revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. If the SCO does not have a better idea of its role in such situations in the future, it will lose respect when it proves unable to deal with them.

The SCO will also be affected by Russia’s improved strategic position. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have both expressed a desire to have better relations with Russia after the change of government in Kyrgyzstan. Russia has shown its ability to hurt Central Asian leaders, and they are scared enough to want better relations with Moscow. This may weaken China’s position in the SCO.

2. What are the implications for China?

Russia has strongly demonstrated its ability to make changes in Central Asia. This may temporarily reverse the declining trend in Russia’s influence in the region, and this means that Russia may now more effectively compete against China for natural resources in Central Asia.

It is also significant that there are no signs Russia discussed the events in Kyrgyzstan with China. Medvedev said he only talked about the crisis with the presidents of Kazakhstan and the United States. It also seems that the president of Kazakhstan, who helped to defuse the crisis, negotiated mostly with Russia and the United States, not Beijing. These facts help to show that despite concern in Russia and America about rising Chinese influence in Central Asia, that influence is still limited.

Russia has also shown its interests to be somewhat different from China. Russia wanted regime change because of geopolitical interests. Although China cares about strategic issues and limiting America’s role in Central Asia, Beijing probably still cares more about stability. Russia helped to overthrow a regime that borders Xinjiang. That cannot be helpful for helping Beijing accomplish its objectives in the province.

There is also an important lesson for everyone: that hedging your bets by talking to opposition figures is important. It looks like the United States was completely unaware that there would be major protests. The embassy was not making good connections with opposition leaders, so they were surprised when the riots took place. In fact, the US State Department is investigating whether the US embassy in Bishkek was being run poorly. It’s hard to blame the embassy, given that Washington cared almost exclusively about good relations with Bakiyev to maintain the Northern Distribution Network. But it’s pretty incredible that the Russians were original enough to help organize a ‘democratic’ revolution for geopolitical reasons.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the new leadership in Kyrgyzstan is not a group of Russian stooges. Rosa Otunbayeva has allowed the American air base to continue to function, and this is likely to continue into the future. In fact, some Russians have expressed unhappiness with her decision to do this. After all, why help a revolution if the new guys don’t scratch your back too? The new administration will likely find it just as hard to please everyone as the previous one. Whether or not they will be any better is an open question. It may be a good thing for the people of Kyrgyzstan that Bakiyev is out, but that it’s unfortunate that the country is still seen as a geopolitical chess piece in Moscow.

Russia and China Switch Places

Two interesting updates on the nuclear summit that point to a new dynamic in the US-Russia-China strategic triangle: now the Chinese are the ‘bad guys’ and the Russians the ‘good guys.’

First, my friends in China are telling me that Hu Jintao is not going to attend the nuclear summit in April as a deliberate snub to Barack Obama because of the weapons sales to Taiwan and the Dalai Lama visit to the White House. The Steinberg/Bader trip did not do enough to satisfy the Chinese.

On the other hand, it looks like the new START treaty with Russia will be signed before the meeting. It was touch and go there for awhile because of new American plans for missile defense in Romania and Bulgaria, , but a recent phone call between Medvedev and Obama seems to indicate that things are back on track.

A Nezavisimaya Gazeta article hints at a possible reason: the article claims that the Russians want a clause that will allow unilateral withdrawal from the agreement if there is a new threat to security (after a set time period), and that the Russians will declare when they sign the treaty that this refers to missile defense.

It’s really interesting that China and Russia have switched places in terms of good/bad relations with the US. It used to be the Russians who were belligerent and the Chinese were too smart to damage relations. Now Hu won’t attend a major summit to snub Obama, and Moscow and Washington seem to have reached some understanding on missile defense that will allow a major nuclear deal.

Guest blogger: A Doctrinal Shift in American Military Strategy?

Today a friend has agreed to write a guest blog for Not So Great Game. His name is Lee Skluzak and he’s a former China Fulbright Scholar and University of Michigan masters program graduate. He’s a super smart guy writing on a super important topic that got a surprisingly little amount of attention:

A Doctrinal Shift in American Military Strategy?

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, American military planners underwent an extensive process of reflection and evaluation. They understood that the conflict, initially launched on the premise of containment and anti-communism, had become bogged down and dragged out over years, leading not only to the muddling of its original purpose but also to the squandering of public support on which democratic war must be sustained. In order to avoid future Vietnams, subsequent strategic thinkers formulated several basic guidelines for the use of force in American military strategy. These principles were first articulated by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and were further publicized and elaborated on by General Colin Powell in the early 1990s. What became known as the “Powell Doctrine,” embraced the following tenets regarding the use of force:

1)      The vital interests of the United States or its allies must be at stake.

2)      Once the decision to use force is made, there must also be a commitment to decisive victory.

3)      Political and military objectives must be clear and obtainable

4)      Whatever force is necessary to achieve those objectives and obtain victory should be made available and regularly reviewed.

5)      There should be a strong basis for the American public to support the operation.

6)      Force should be used only as a last resort, after all other alternatives have been exhausted.

In light of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were many criticisms which drew explicitly from these principles. Indeed, the “Powell Doctrine” experienced something of a renaissance because of how the second Iraq War was conducted and prosecuted. Now, as our presence in Iraq begins to wind down and President Obama hints of a gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011, what will American military strategy look like in the future? Will the “Powell Doctrine” once again become the dominant paradigm?

There may be a clue to this question in a recent speech given by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Michael Mullen. In his remarks to Kansas State University, Admiral Mullen lays out what one might call a “Mullen Doctrine.” In the first part of the speech, he reviews past U.S. military doctrines and explains how each has something to teach us. “There is no one single defining American way of war,” Mullen says, “It changes over time, and it should change over time, adapting appropriately to the most relevant threats to our national security, and the means by which that security is best preserved.”

This goes especially for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which have had their own substantial impact on the conduct and character of war. In the second part of the speech, Mullen expounds on how these conflicts have shaped his thought, “I’ve watched and advised two administrations as they have dealt with this struggle. And I’ve come to three conclusions – three principles – about the proper use of modern military forces. The first is that military power should not – maybe cannot – be the last resort of the state.” [emphasis added]

Here is a repudiation of what might be regarded as the cornerstone of the “Powell Doctrine.” Moreover, it seems almost counterintuitive given the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. But Admiral Mullen is not throwing all his chips in with the military instrument. He further argues, “Defense and diplomacy are simply no longer discrete choices, one to be applied when the other one fails, but must, in fact, complement one another throughout the messy process of international relations.” In fact, he reveals, “My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving fast enough in this regard. U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands. It’s one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders; quite another to always have to be the fire chief.”

There are other indications that while Mullen is going beyond the “Powell Doctrine” by dropping the “last resort” caveat, he is also incorporating many of its core elements. For example, he echoes (2) and (4):

“I would argue that in the future struggles of the asymmetric counterinsurgent variety, we ought to make it a precondition of committing our troops, that we will do so only if and when the other instruments of national power are ready to engage as well.”

Admiral Mullen’s second principle is also resounding endorsement of (3):

“Force should, to the maximum extent possible, be applied in a precise and principled way.”

Finally, the third principle of the “Mullen Doctrine” is congruent with the spirit of the “Powell Doctrine.” It holds that, “Policy and strategy should constantly struggle with one another.” The nature of war is as fluid today as it was in the jungles of Vietnam. The enemy is no longer the Vietcong but a shadowy criminal syndicate that embraces an extreme Islamist ideology. It consists of state and non-state actors. Their bases of operations are constantly in flux, existing in restive border regions, failed states, cyberspace and beyond. Policies promulgated today will not necessarily be applicable in the future and strategy must be flexible and capable of adapting. That means constant reevaluation, something that Powell himself endorsed wholeheartedly when he was in Vietnam and when he served in the same position as Admiral Mullen.

Curiously enough, there was one part of the speech that I think deserved further elaboration. Admiral Mullen observes, “there’s been much debate over how to balance traditional and irregular warfare capabilities in our military.” He argues that his second principle applies equally to both, but I am more interested in where the greater emphasis ought to be. Should we pour more resources into preparing for conflicts similar to Iraq and Afghanistan or should we be investing in capabilities suitable to the next generation of great power conflict? This question gets at the heart of future American foreign policy and I hope is explored in greater detail.

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/03/08/speech_on_military_strategy_98844.html